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We analyze liquidity components of corporate bond spreads during 2005–2009 using a
new robust illiquidity measure. The spread contribution from illiquidity increases
dramatically with the onset of the subprime crisis. The increase is slow and persistent
for investment grade bonds while the effect is stronger but more short-lived for
speculative grade bonds. Bonds become less liquid when ﬁnancial distress hits a lead
underwriter and the liquidity of bonds issued by ﬁnancial ﬁrms dries up under crises.
During the subprime crisis, ﬂight-to-quality is conﬁned to AAA-rated bonds.
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(D. Lando).evidence that illiquidity in addition to credit risk con-
tributes to corporate bond spreads, it is reasonable to
believe that at least part of the spread-widening can be
attributed to a decrease in bond liquidity. We use TRACE
(Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine) transactions
data for corporate bonds and a new measure of liquidity
to analyze how illiquidity has contributed to bond spreads
before and after the onset of the subprime crisis. Our
liquidity measure outperforms the Roll (1984) measure
used in Bao, Pan, and Wang (2011) and zero-trading days
used in Chen, Lesmond, and Wei (2007) in explaining
spread variation.
We use the measure to deﬁne the liquidity component
of bond spreads as the difference in bond yields between
a bond with average liquidity and a very liquid bond. At
the onset of the crisis, the liquidity component rose for all
rating classes except AAA. The increase occurred both
because of falling bond liquidity and because of increased
sensitivity of bond spreads to illiquidity. Before the crisis
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ranging from 1 basis point (bp) for AAA to 4bp for BBB. For
AAA bonds the contribution remained small at 5bp during
the crisis—consistent with a ﬂight-to-quality into those
bonds. More dramatically, the liquidity component for
BBB bonds increased to 93bp, and for speculative grade
bonds rose from 58 to 197bp. For speculative grade bonds,
premiums peaked around the Lehman Brothers default in
the fall of 2008 and returned almost to pre-crisis levels in
the summer of 2009.
We also use our measure to provide suggestive evidence
of the mechanisms by which bond liquidity was affected. If
lead underwriters are providers of liquidity of a bond in
secondary market trading, it is conceivable that ﬁnancial
distress of a lead underwriter causes the liquidity of the
bond to decrease relative to other bonds. We ﬁnd that bonds
which had Bear Stearns as lead underwriter had lower
liquidity during the take-over of Bear Stearns and bonds
with Lehman as lead underwriter had lower liquidity
around the bankruptcy of Lehman. Furthermore, we inves-
tigate whether the time-series variation of liquidity of
corporate bonds issued by ﬁnancial ﬁrms is different from
the variation for bonds issued by industrial ﬁrms. Our time-
series study reveals that bonds issued by ﬁnancial ﬁrms had
similar liquidity as bonds issued by industrial ﬁrms, except
in extreme stress periods, where bonds of ﬁnancial ﬁrms
became very illiquid, overall and when compared to bonds
issued by industrial ﬁrms. A potential explanation is the
heightened information asymmetry regarding the state of
ﬁnancial ﬁrms.
Finally, measuring the covariation of an individual bond’s
liquidity with that of the entire corporate bond market, we
ﬁnd that this measure of systematic liquidity risk was not a
signiﬁcant contributor to spreads before the onset of the
crisis but did contribute to spreads after the onset except for
AAA-rated bonds. This indicates that the ﬂight-to-quality
effect in investment grade bonds found in Acharya, Amihud,
and Bharath (2010) is conﬁned to AAA-rated bonds.
Our liquidity measure, which we denote l, is an
equally weighted sum of four variables all normalized to
a common scale: Amihud’s measure of price impact, a
measure of roundtrip cost of trading, and the variability of
each of these two measures. We can think of the Amihud
measure and the roundtrip cost measure as measuring
liquidity, and the variability measures as representing the
sum of systematic and unsystematic liquidity risk. Due to
the infrequent trading of bonds, we ﬁnd it difﬁcult to
measure the systematic part accurately on a frequent basis,
so we use total liquidity risk and study the systematic part
separately. l is a close approximation to the ﬁrst principal
component extracted among a large number of potential
liquidity proxies. When we regress corporate bond spreads
on l and control for credit risk, the measure contributes to
spreads consistently across ratings and in our two regimes.
This consistency is important for drawing conclusions when
we split the sample by industry and lead underwriter. The
TRACE transactions data allow us to calculate liquidity
proxies more accurately and help us shed new light on
previous results on liquidity in corporate bonds. Once actual
transactions data are used, the ﬁnding in Chen, Lesmond,
and Wei (2007) that zero-trading days predict spreadslargely disappears. In fact, the number of zero-trading days
tends to decrease during the crisis, because trades in less
liquid bonds are split into trades of smaller size.
We perform a series of robustness checks, and the two
most important checks are as follows. To support the claim
that our measure l is not measuring credit risk, we run
regressions on a matched sample of corporate bonds using
pairs of bonds issued by the same ﬁrm with maturity close
to each other. Instead of credit controls, we use a dummy
variable for each matched pair and estimate how spreads
depend on l. In this alternative approach to controlling for
credit risk, l consistently remains signiﬁcant. The second
check relates to the fact that we use data for bonds for
which we have transactions for some period during 2005–
2009. To test that our results are not confounded by an
increase in new issues towards the end of the sample
period, we redo results using only bonds in existence by
2005, and results remain similar.
The literature on how liquidity affects asset prices is
extensive. A comprehensive survey can be found in
Amihud, Mendelson, and Pedersen (2005). In recent years,
the illiquidity of corporate bonds has been seen as a
possible explanation for the ‘credit spread puzzle,’ i.e.,
the claim that yield spreads on corporate bonds are larger
than what can be explained by default risk (see Huang
and Huang, 2003; Elton, Gruber, Agrawal, and Mann,
2001; Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin, 2001).
Earlier papers showing that liquidity proxies are signiﬁcant
explanatory variables for credit spreads are Houweling,
Mentink, and Vorst (2005), Downing, Underwood, and Xing
(2005), de Jong and Driessen (2006), Sarig andWarga (1989),
and Covitz and Downing (2007). Lin, Wang, and Wu (2011)
study liquidity risk in the corporate bond market but do not
focus on the regime-dependent nature of liquidity risk. Bao,
Pan, and Wang (2011) extract an aggregate liquidity mea-
sure from investment grade bonds using the Roll measure
and examine the pricing implications of illiquidity. The fact
that l is more robust than the Roll measure allows us to get
a more detailed picture of bond market liquidity across
underwriter, sector, and rating. Furthermore, we investigate
the liquidity of both investment grade and speculative grade
bonds.
2. Data description
Since January 2001, members of the Financial Industry
Regulatory Authority have been required to report their
secondary over-the-counter corporate bond transactions
through TRACE (Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine).
Because of the uncertain beneﬁt to investors of price
transparency, not all trades reported to TRACE were
initially disseminated at the launch of TRACE on July 1,
2002. Since October 2004, trades in almost all bonds
except some lightly traded bonds are disseminated (see
Goldstein and Hotchkiss, 2008, for details). Because we
use quarterly observations, we start our sample period at
the beginning of the subsequent quarter.
We use a sample of corporate bonds which have some
trade reports in TRACE during the period January 1, 2005
to June 30, 2009. We limit the sample to ﬁxed rate bullet
bonds that are not callable, convertible, putable, or have
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Bloomberg, and this provides us initially with 10,785 bond
issues. We use ratings from Datastream and bonds with
missing ratings are excluded.1 This reduces the sample to
5,376 bonds. Retail-sized trades (trades below $100,000 in
volume) are discarded and after ﬁltering out erroneous
trades, as described in Dick-Nielsen (2009), we are left with
8,212,990 trades. Finally, we collect analysts’ forecast dis-
persion from IBES, share prices for the issuing ﬁrms and ﬁrm
accounting ﬁgures from Bloomberg, swap rates from Data-
stream, Treasury yields consisting of the most recently
auctioned issues adjusted to constant maturities published
by the Federal Reserve in the H-15 release, and LIBOR rates
from British Bankers’ Association. If forecast dispersion,
share prices, or ﬁrm accounting ﬁgures are not available,
we drop the corresponding observations from the sample.
3. Empirical methodology
This section provides details on the regression analysis
conducted in the next section and deﬁnes the set of liquidity
variables we use.
3.1. Regression
As dependent variable we use the yield spread to the
swap rate for every bond at the end of each quarter.
Implementation details are given in Appendix A.
To control for credit risk, we follow Blume, Lim, and
MacKinlay (1998) and add the ratio of operating income
to sales, ratio of long term debt to assets, leverage ratio,
equity volatility, and four pretax interest coverage dum-
mies to the regressions.2 To capture effects of the general
economic environment on the credit risk of ﬁrms, we
include the level and slope of the swap curve, deﬁned as
the 10-year swap rate and the difference between the
10-year and 1-year swap rate. Dufﬁe and Lando (2001)
show that credit spreads may increase when there is
incomplete information on the ﬁrm’s true credit quality.
To proxy for this effect, we follow Gu¨ntay and Hackbarth
(2010) and use dispersion in earnings forecasts as a measure
of incomplete information. Finally, we add bond age, time-
to-maturity, and size of coupon to the regressions; see, for
example, Sarig and Warga (1989), Houweling, Mentink, and
Vorst (2005), and Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis (2005). We do
not use Credit Default Swap (CDS) data since that would1 We use the rating from Standard and Poor’s. If this rating is
missing, we use the rating from Moody’s and if this is missing, the rating
from Fitch. If we still do not have a rating we use the company rating.
2 The pretax interest coverage dummies are deﬁned as follows. We
deﬁne the pretax interest rate coverage (IRC) ratio as EBIT divided by
interest expenses. It expresses how easily the company can cover its
interest rate expenses. However, the distribution is highly skewed. As in
Blume, Lim, and MacKinlay (1998), we control for this skewness by
creating four dummies (pretax dummies) which allows for a non-linear
relationship with the spread. The ﬁrst dummy is set to the IRC ratio if it
is less than 5 and 5 if it is above. The second dummy is set to zero if IRC
is below 5, to the IRC ratio minus 5 if it lies between 5 and 10, and 5 if it
lies above. The third dummy is set to zero if IRC is below 10, to the IRC
ratio minus 10 if it lies between 10 and 20, and 10 if it lies above. The
fourth dummy is set to zero if IRC is below 20 and is set to IRC minus 20
if it lies above 20 (truncating the dummy value at 80).restrict the sample to only those ﬁrms for which CDS
contracts are trading.
For each rating class, we run separate regressions
using quarterly observations. The regressions are
Spreadit ¼ aþg Liquidityitþb1 Bond ageit
þb2 Amount issueditþb3 Couponit
þb4 Time-to-maturityitþb5 Eq:volit
þb6 Operatingitþb7 Leverageitþb8 Long debtit
þb9,pretax Pretax dummiesitþb1010y Swapt
þb1110y21y Swapt
þb12 Forecast dispersionitþEit , ð1Þ
where i is bond issue, t is quarter, and Liquidityit contains one
of the liquidity proxies deﬁned below. Since we have panel
data of yield spreads with each issuer potentially having
more than one bond outstanding at any point in time, we
calculate two-dimensional cluster robust standard errors (see
Petersen, 2009). This corrects for time-series effects, ﬁrm
ﬁxed effects, and heteroskedasticity in the residuals.
3.2. Liquidity measures
There is no consensus on how to measure the liquidity
of an asset so we examine a number of liquidity-related
measures for corporate bonds. Appendix A describes the
measures and their implementation in more detail.
We use the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure to esti-
mate the price impact of trades, deﬁned as the price impact
of a trade per unit traded. We proxy for bid–ask spreads
using two different measures, the Roll measure and Imputed
Roundtrip Trades. Roll (1984) ﬁnds that under certain
assumptions, the bid–ask spread can be extracted from
the covariance between consecutive returns, and the Roll
measure is based on this insight. Feldhu¨tter (in press)
proposes to measure bid–ask spreads using Imputed Round-
trip Trades (IRT). Most of the data do not contain informa-
tion about the buy and sell side in trades, and IRTs are based
on ﬁnding two trades close in time that are likely to be a
buy and a sell. Such trades are used to construct Imputed
Roundtrip Costs, IRC, as explained in Appendix A.
We also consider trading activity measures. Turnover is
the quarterly turnover in percent of total amount out-
standing, while zero-trading daysmeasures the percentage
of days during a quarter where a bond does not trade. We
also calculate ﬁrm zero-trading days as the percentage of
days during a quarter where none of the issuing ﬁrm’s
bonds traded. Even if a single bond seldom trades, the
issuing ﬁrm might have many bonds outstanding and
there might be frequent trading in these close substitutes.
Finally, we consider liquidity risk by taking the stan-
dard deviation of daily observations of the Amihud
measure and Imputed Roundtrip Trades. These two mea-
sures do not separate total liquidity risk into a systematic
and unsystematic component. Arguably, only the systematic
component is important for pricing, but we ﬁnd it difﬁcult
to measure this component on a frequent basis, so we
calculate the total component and address the systematic
component later in the paper.
Mahanti, Nashikkar, Subramanyam, Chacko, and Mallik
(2008) infer a turnover measure for bonds from bond
Table 1
Principal component loadings on the liquidity variables.
This table shows the principal component analysis loadings on each of the eight liquidity variables along with the cumulative explanatory power of the
components. The liquidity variables are measured quarterly for each bond in the data sample. The data are U.S. corporate bond transactions data from
TRACE and the sample period is from 2005:Q1 to 2009:Q2.
Panel A: Principal component loadings, pre-subprime (2005:Q1–2007:Q1)
1PC 2PC 3PC 4PC 5PC 6PC 7PC 8PC
Amihud 0.45 0.05 0.12 0.05 0.44 0.70 0.12 0.28
Roll 0.26 0.33 0.08 0.86 0.27 0.06 0.06 0.02
Firm zero 0.04 0.64 0.02 0.39 0.56 0.36 0.07 0.02
Bond zero 0.00 0.67 0.10 0.10 0.56 0.45 0.05 0.11
Turnover 0.02 0.07 0.98 0.07 0.15 0.08 0.01 0.03
IRC 0.52 0.06 0.03 0.15 0.00 0.10 0.39 0.73
Amihud risk 0.47 0.11 0.01 0.16 0.01 0.09 0.85 0.09
IRC risk 0.49 0.12 0.06 0.21 0.29 0.40 0.31 0.60
Cum. % explained 39% 59% 72% 81% 89% 94% 99% 100%
Panel B: Principal component loadings, post-subprime (2007:Q2–2009:Q2)
1PC 2PC 3PC 4PC 5PC 6PC 7PC 8PC
Amihud 0.46 0.04 0.10 0.10 0.07 0.73 0.43 0.21
Roll 0.06 0.47 0.35 0.78 0.10 0.02 0.17 0.02
Firm zero 0.11 0.59 0.28 0.33 0.62 0.20 0.17 0.00
Bond zero 0.12 0.64 0.07 0.21 0.67 0.16 0.21 0.12
Turnover 0.14 0.05 0.88 0.39 0.08 0.20 0.12 0.01
IRC 0.52 0.15 0.06 0.09 0.09 0.26 0.28 0.73
Amihud risk 0.46 0.03 0.07 0.21 0.30 0.19 0.78 0.04
IRC risk 0.51 0.02 0.09 0.13 0.23 0.51 0.10 0.63
Cum. % explained 39% 58% 71% 81% 88% 94% 99% 100%
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ested in yield spread effects of illiquidity, so we conﬁne
ourselves to the more liquid segment of the corporate bond
market for which some prices are observed, and for this
reason we do not use latent liquidity.
To see if most of the relevant information in the liquidity
proxies can be captured by a few factors, we conduct a
principal component (PC) analysis in Table 1 for the two
periods 2005:Q1–2007:Q1 and 2007:Q2–2009:Q2.3 The
explanatory power and the loadings of the ﬁrst four PCs
are stable in the two periods and we see that they have clear
interpretations. The ﬁrst component explains 40% of the
variation in the liquidity variables and is close to an equally
weighted linear combination of the Amihud and IRC mea-
sures and their associated liquidity risk measures. The
second PC explains 20% and is a zero-trading days measure,
the third PC explains 13% and is a turnover measure, and the
fourth PC explains 9% and is a Roll measure. The last four PCs
explain less than 20% and do not have clear interpretations.
The principal component loadings on the ﬁrst PC in
Table 1 lead us to deﬁne a factor that loads evenly on
Amihud, IRC, Amihud risk, and IRC risk, and does not load on
the other liquidity measures. The factor is simpler to calcu-
late than the ﬁrst PC while retaining its properties. We add
this factor to our liquidity proxies in our analysis and call it l
(for details, see Appendix A).3 An extensive analysis of latent common factors in liquidity
measures for equity markets can be found in Korajczyk and Sadka
(2008).4. Liquidity premia
4.1. Summary statistics
Table 2 shows summary statistics for the liquidity
variables. We see that the median quarterly turnover is
4.5%, meaning that for the average bond in the sample, it
takes ﬁve to six years to turn over once.4 The median
number of bond zero-trading days is 60.7%, consistent
with the notion that the corporate bond market is an
illiquid market. We also see that the median number of
ﬁrm zero-trading days is 0%. This shows that although a
given corporate bond might not trade very often, the
issuing ﬁrm typically has some bond that is trading.
The median Amihud measure is 0.0044 implying that a
trade of $300,000 in an average bond moves price by
roughly 0.13%. Han and Zhou (2008) also calculate the
Amihud measure for corporate bond data using TRACE data
and ﬁnd a much stronger price effect of a trade. For
example, they ﬁnd that a trade of $300,000 in a bond, on
average, moves the price by 10.2%. This discrepancy is
largely due to the exclusion of small trades in our sample
and underscores the importance of ﬁltering out retail
trades when estimating transaction costs of institutional
investors.
The median roundtrip cost in percentage of the price is
0.22% according to the IRC measure, while the roundtrip4 The turnover is a lower bound on the actual turnover since trade
sizes above $1mil ($5mil) for speculative (investment) grade bonds are
registered as trades of size $1mil ($5mil).
Table 2
Statistics for liquidity proxies.
This table shows statistics for corporate bond liquidity proxies. The proxies are calculated quarterly for each bond from 2005:Q1 to 2009:Q2. Panel A
shows quantiles for the proxies. Panel B shows correlations among the proxies. The data are U.S. corporate bond transactions data from TRACE and the
sample period is from 2005:Q1 to 2009:Q2. There is a total of 2,224 bond issues and 380 bond issuers in our sample.
Panel A: Summary statistics for liquidity proxies
l Amihud Roll Firm zero Bond zero Turnover IRC Amihud risk IRC risk
99th 13.42 0.0813 8.39 92.1 96.8 0.247 0.0156 0.1592 0.01702
95th 7.44 0.0427 3.16 76.2 93.5 0.136 0.0096 0.0792 0.00997
75th 0.98 0.0120 1.05 12.5 79.7 0.070 0.0041 0.0298 0.00427
50th 1.19 0.0044 0.53 0.0 60.7 0.045 0.0022 0.0147 0.00220
25th 2.85 0.0015 0.29 0.0 31.7 0.028 0.0012 0.0064 0.00102
5th 3.08 0.0003 0.12 0.0 6.3 0.012 0.0005 0.0011 0.00024
1st 3.33 0.0000 0.06 0.0 0.0 0.005 0.0002 0.0002 0.00003
Panel B: Correlation matrix for liquidity proxies
l Amihud Roll Firm zero Bond zero Turnover IRC Amihud risk IRC risk
l 1.00
Amihud 0.83 1.00
Roll 0.17 0.16 1.00
Firm zero 0.10 0.08 0.11 1.00
Bond zero 0.12 0.08 0.18 0.46 1.00
Turnover 0.16 0.20 0.04 0.03 0.04 1.00
IRC 0.94 0.72 0.20 0.03 0.03 0.13 1.00
Amihud risk 0.85 0.61 0.10 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.69 1.00
IRC risk 0.89 0.57 0.14 0.12 0.19 0.11 0.87 0.69 1.00
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transaction costs are modest for a large part of the corporate
bond market, consistent with ﬁndings in Edwards, Harris,
and Piwowar (2007), Goldstein, Hotchkiss, and Sirri (2007),
and Bessembinder, Maxwell, and Venkaraman (2006).
The correlations in Panel B of 87% between IRC and IRC
risk and 61% between Amihud and Amihud risk show that
liquidity and liquidity risk are highly correlated. This is
consistent with results in Acharya and Pedersen (2005)
who likewise ﬁnd a high correlation between liquidity
and liquidity risk. Interestingly, there is a high correlation
of 72% between market depth (Amihud) and bid/ask
spread (IRC). Panel B also shows that the Amihud measure
is negatively correlated with ﬁrm zero, bond zero, and
turnover, while the Roll measure has positive correlations
with the three trading activity variables.
4.2. Liquidity pricing
To get a ﬁrst-hand impression of the importance of
liquidity, we regress in Table 3 corporate bond yield spreads
on our liquidity variables one at a time while controlling for
credit risk according to Eq. (1).5 We do this for ﬁve rating
categories and before and after the onset of the subprime
crisis. Running regressions for different rating categories
shows how robust our conclusions are regarding the effect
of liquidity. Furthermore, by splitting the sample into pre-
and post-subprime, we see how liquidity is priced in two5 We only use observations for which an estimate for all measures
exists. This ensures that the regression coefﬁcients for all proxies are
based on the same sample. We have also run the regressions where we
allow an observation to enter a regression if the observation has an
estimate for this liquidity proxy, although it might not have estimates of
some of the other proxies. The results are very similar.different regimes; the pre-subprime period was a period
with plenty of liquidity while the market in the post-
subprime period has suffered from a lack of liquidity.
Table 3 shows that transaction costs are priced, at least
when we proxy bid–ask spreads with the IRC measure,
consistent with the ﬁnding in Chen, Lesmond, and Wei
(2007) that bid-ask spreads are priced. We also see that the
Amihud measure has positive regression coefﬁcients across
all ratings and most of them are statistically signiﬁcant.
Furthermore, the regression coefﬁcients for IRC risk and
Amihud risk are positive and almost all signiﬁcantly so.
The regression coefﬁcients for turnover in the invest-
ment grade segment are negative in Table 3, while the
reverse is the case for speculative grade bonds. This indi-
cates that high turnover tends to reduce credit spreads for
investment grade bonds but not for speculative grade
bonds. The signiﬁcance of the coefﬁcients is modest though,
so the evidence is not conclusive.
Turning to zero-trading days, Table 3 shows that there is
no consistent relationship between the number of zero-
trading days and spreads. If anything, the relationship tends
to be negative since 14 out of 20 bond and ﬁrm zero
regression coefﬁcients are negative. This is surprising given
that Chen, Lesmond, and Wei (2007) ﬁnd that corporate
bond spreads—when controlling for credit risk—depend
positively on the number of zero-trading days.6
The weak link between zero-trading days and spreads
is consistent with the theoretical results in Huberman and6 While we use actual transaction data, Chen, Lesmond, and Wei
(2007) use data from Datastream and deﬁne a zero-trading day as a day
where the price does not change. The working paper version of our
paper has a graph (available on request) showing that there is very little
relation between actual and Datastream zero-trading days. This might
explain our different results.
Table 3
Liquidity regressions.
For each rating class R and each liquidity variable L a pooled regression is run with credit risk controls
SpreadRit ¼ aRþgRLitþCredit risk controlsitþEit ,
where i is for bond in rating R and t is time measured in quarters. In total, 45 regressions are run (nine liquidity variablesﬁve
rating classes). This table shows for each regression the coefﬁcient and t-statistics in parentheses for the liquidity variable. The
proxies are described in detail in Section 3 and are calculated quarterly from 2005:Q1 to 2009:Q2. The data are U.S. corporate
bond transactions from TRACE. Panel A shows the coefﬁcients using data before the subprime crisis, while Panel B shows the
coefﬁcients using data after the onset of the subprime crisis. Standard errors are corrected for time series effects, ﬁrm ﬁxed
effects, and heteroskedasticity, and signiﬁcance at 10% level is marked n, at 5% marked nn, and at 1% marked nnn.
Panel A: Pre-subprime (2005:Q1–2007:Q1)
AAA AA A BBB Spec
l 0:0038nnn
ð2:97Þ
0:0056nnn
ð2:95Þ
0:0131nnn
ð2:61Þ
0:0260nnn
ð3:69Þ
0:1726nnn
ð5:34Þ
Amihud 1:15nnn
ð4:87Þ
2:08nnn
ð3:85Þ
4:14nnn
ð3:18Þ
3:68
ð1:52Þ 36:26
nnn
ð4:14Þ
Roll 0:02nnn
ð3:18Þ
0:02nnn
ð3:48Þ
0:01
ð1:48Þ
0:02
ð0:53Þ
0:01
ð0:12Þ
Firm zero 0:000
ð0:46Þ
0:001
ð1:42Þ
0:000
ð0:74Þ 0:001
n
ð1:66Þ
0:010
ð1:43Þ
Bond zero 0:000
ð0:09Þ
0:000
ð0:86Þ
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when price impact of trades is high, because they attempt
to reduce the total price impact by submitting more but
smaller orders. All else equal, more trades therefore occur
in illiquid bonds since it is necessary to split a sell order in
several trades, while it can be executed in a single trade in
a liquid bond.7 If this explanation holds true, we should
expect to see less zero-trading days in illiquid times7 Goldstein, Hotchkiss, and Sirri (2007) ﬁnd that dealers behave
differently when trading liquid and illiquid bonds. When trading liquid
bonds they are more likely to buy the bond, have it as inventory, and sell
it in smaller amounts. When trading illiquid bonds they quickly sell the
entire position, so they perform more of a matching function in these
bonds. This is consistent with our argument that illiquid bonds trade
more often, which can be illustrated with the following example. In a
liquid bond the investor sells $1,000,000 to a dealer, who sells it to
investors in two amounts of $500,000. In an illiquid bond the investor
sells $500,000 to two different dealers, who each sell the $500,000 to an
investor. The total number of trades in the illiquid bond is four, while it
is three in the liquid bond.without an increase in the turnover. Fig. 1 shows that this
is the case during the subprime crisis. The graph with the
title ‘Bond zero’ shows that the average percentage zero-
trading days decreases during the subprime crisis while the
graph with the title ‘Turnover’ shows that turnover decreases
slightly. Drawing conclusions from Fig. 1 might be mislead-
ing since a bond in a given quarter is only included in the
sample if it has a full set of accounting variables and trades at
least four times that quarter. To address the concern that this
may bias zero-trading days over time, Fig. 2 shows the time
series of quarterly average number of trades and average
trade size for all straight coupon bullet bonds in our sample
period. The graph shows that there was an increase in the
average number of trades and a decrease in the average trade
size during the subprime crisis.
Table 3 also shows that l is signiﬁcant for all rating
categories pre- and post-subprime. For nine out of ten
regression coefﬁcients, the signiﬁcance is at a 1% level.
Compared to previously proposed liquidity proxies, zero-
trading days (Chen, Lesmond, and Wei, 2007), and the Roll
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Fig. 1. Time series of liquidity variables. This graph plots the time series of liquidity variables along with a line marking the start of the subprime crisis
(beginning in 2007:Q2). The data are U.S. corporate bond transactions from TRACE and the sample period is from 2005:Q1 to 2009:Q2. Liquidity variables
are measured quarterly for each bond, and for every liquidity variable the mean value of the variable across all bonds each quarter is graphed.
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sistent proxy for liquidity. Therefore, we use l as our
liquidity measure in the rest of the paper.
The liquidity measure l and its four individual com-
ponents all provide the same evidence regarding the
compensation for holding illiquid bonds: since the regres-
sion coefﬁcients in Table 3 increase post-subprime, inves-
tors require a larger compensation for investing in illiquid
bonds. Furthermore, illiquidity has increased as Fig. 1
shows, so the impact of illiquidity on yield spreads is
twofold: through an increase in illiquidity and through a
higher risk premium on illiquidity.
4.3. Size of liquidity component
To calculate the impact of corporate bond illiquidity on
yield spreads, we do the following. For each rating R and
in both regimes, we run the pooled regression
SpreadRit ¼ aRþbRlitþCredit risk controlsitþEit ,where i refers to bond, t to time (measured in quarters of
year), and lit is our liquidity measure. We deﬁne the
liquidity score for a bond in a given quarter as bRlit .
Within each rating (AAA, AA, A, BBB, Spec), period (pre- or
post-subprime), and maturity (0–2y, 2–5y, 5–30y) we sort
all observations according to their liquidity score. The
liquidity component of an average bond is deﬁned as the
50% quantile minus the 5% quantile of the liquidity score
distribution. Thus, the liquidity component measures the
difference in bond yields between a bond with average
liquidity and a very liquid bond. This approach allows us
to look directly at the importance of liquidity by estimat-
ing how much l contributes to corporate bond spreads,
instead of deﬁning liquidity as a residual after controlling
for credit risk. In particular, the difference between corpo-
rate bond spreads and CDS premia is often used as a proxy
for liquidity. For example, Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis (2005)
subtract CDS premia from corporate bond spreads to arrive
at a liquidity component of credit spreads. However, the
CDS spread is often larger than the comparable bond spread
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Fig. 2. Time series of average number of trades and average trade size in the full sample. This graph plots the time series of average number of trades and
average trade size in a quarter for a corporate bond along with a line marking the start of the subprime crisis (beginning in 2007:Q2). The data are U.S.
corporate bond transactions from TRACE and the sample period is from 2005:Q1 to 2009:Q2. A bond is included in every quarter if it traded at least one
time during the sample period 2005:Q1–2009:Q2. The top graphs are based on institutional trades, i.e., trades of size $100,000 or more, while the bottom
graphs are based on all trades.
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Zhou (2008) ﬁnd the average implied liquidity component
for speculative grade bonds to be negative. Furthermore,
Bongaerts, Driessen, de Jong (2011) ﬁnd that there are also
liquidity components in CDS spreads.
Table 4 shows the size of the liquidity component.
Following Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2008), we cal-
culate conﬁdence bands by performing a wild cluster
bootstrap of the regression residuals. We see that the
liquidity component becomes larger as the rating quality
of the bond decreases. For investment grade ratings, the
component is small with an average pre-subprime across
maturity of 0.8bp for AAA, 1.0bp for AA, 2.4bp for A, and
3.9bp for BBB. For speculative grade, the liquidity compo-
nent is larger and estimated to be 57.6bp.
There is a strong increase in the liquidity component in
the post-subprime period as Panel B in Table 4 shows. The
component increases by a factor of 10 or more in invest-
ment grade bonds of rating AA, A, and BBB while itincreases by a factor of 3–4 in speculative grade bonds.
This shows that liquidity has dried out under the sub-
prime crisis and part of the spread-widening for bonds is
due to a higher liquidity premium.
While liquidity components in all ratings increase, we
see that the increase in AAA bonds is modest. Even after
the onset of the subprime crisis the component is 8bp or
less, which is small compared to the component of other
bonds. We see in Table 3 that the regression coefﬁcient for
AAA on l is small post-subprime compared to those of
other rating classes, so the sensitivity of AAA-rated bonds
to liquidity is small. This suggests that a ﬂight-to-quality
leads investors into buying AAA-rated bonds regardless of
their liquidity.
The average liquidity premium in speculative grade
bonds is 57.6bp pre-subprime, so even in this liquidity-rich
period speculative grade bonds commanded a sizeable
liquidity premium. Post-subprime, the liquidity premium
increased to 196.8bp. An A-rated bond has an average
Table 4
Liquidity component in basis points.
For each rating R, we run the pooled regression
SpreadRit ¼ aRþbRlitþCredit risk controlsitþEit ,
where i refers to bond, t to time, and lit is our liquidity measure. The bond spread is measured with respect to the swap rate. Within each rating and
maturity bucket (0–2y, 2–5y, and 5–30y), we sort increasingly all values of lit and ﬁnd the median value l50 and the 5% value l5. The liquidity component
in the bucket is deﬁned as bðl50l5Þ. This table shows for all buckets the liquidity component with standard errors in parentheses. Conﬁdence bands are
found by a wild cluster bootstrap. The data are U.S. corporate bond transactions from TRACE and the sample period is from 2005:Q1 to 2009:Q2.
Panel A: Liquidity component in basis points, pre-subprime (2005Q1–2007:Q1)
Average Liquidity component, basis points Number of observations
0–2y 2–5y 5–30y 0–2y 2–5y 5–30y
AAA 0.8 0:6
ð0:3;0:8Þ
0:9
ð0:5;1:3Þ
1:1
ð0:6;1:5Þ
162 178 193
AA 1.0 0:7
ð0:3;1:1Þ
1:0
ð0:4;1:7Þ
1:3
ð0:5;2:2Þ
704 667 498
A 2.4 1:5
ð0:6;2:3Þ
2:5
ð1:1;3:9Þ
3:2
ð1:4;4:9Þ
1540 1346 1260
BBB 3.9 2:8
ð1:4;4:4Þ
4:0
ð1:9;6:2Þ
4:7
ð2:3;7:3Þ
517 270 553
Spec 57.6 45:0
ð32:3;57:4Þ
44:0
ð31:5;56:0Þ
83:9
ð60:2;106:8Þ
270 324 480
Panel B: Liquidity component in basis points, post-subprime (2007:Q2–2009:Q2)
Average Liquidity component, basis points Number of observations
0–2y 2–5y 5–30y 0–2y 2–5y 5–30y
AAA 4.9 2:5
ð0:5;4:4Þ
4:5
ð0:9;8:0Þ
7:9
ð1:7;14:1Þ
110 149 155
AA 41.8 23:5
ð12:9;33:2Þ
37:1
ð20:3;52:4Þ
64:7
ð35:5;91:4Þ
493 572 483
A 50.7 26:6
ð15:3;39:2Þ
51:0
ð29:3;75:1Þ
74:5
ð42:9;109:7Þ
762 878 890
BBB 92.7 64:3
ð36:5;92:7Þ
115:6
ð65:6;166:6Þ
98:1
ð55:7;141:4Þ
123 159 256
Spec 196.8 123:6
ð80:2;157:3Þ
224:0
ð145:3;285:1Þ
242:7
ð157:4;308:8Þ
133 129 201
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ity of such a bond post-subprime is similar to that of a
speculative grade bond pre-subprime.
The size of the liquidity component in investment grade
spreads pre-subprime is comparable in magnitude to the
nondefault component found by subtracting the CDS pre-
mium from the corporate-swap spread (swap basis); see
Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis (2005), Blanco, Brennan, and
Marsh (2005), and Han and Zhou (2008).8 These papers look
at recent periods before the subprime crisis and our pre-
subprime results agree with their results in that there is a
modest liquidity premium in investment grade corporate
bond yields. The nondefault component for speculative
bonds extracted from the swap basis is smaller and often
negative, and the evidence presented here suggests that
other factors than corporate bond liquidity are important for
explaining the basis for speculative grade bonds.98 Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis (2005) ﬁnd an average nondefault
component of -7.2bp for AAA/AA, 10.5bp for A, and 9.7bp for BBB, Han
and Zhou (2008) ﬁnd the nondefault component to be 0.3bp for AAA,
3.3bp for AA, 6.7bp for A, and 23.5bp for BBB, while Blanco, Brennan, and
Marsh (2005) ﬁnd it to be 6.9bp for AAA/AA, 0.5bp for A, and 14.9bp for
BBB.
9 Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis (2005) report an average of 17.6bp for
BB, while Han and Zhou (2008) estimate it to be 2.8bp for BB, 53.5bp
for B, and 75.4bp for CCC.Turning to the term structure of liquidity, the general
pattern across ratings and regime is that the liquidity
component increases as maturity increases. Overall, the
premium in basis points is around twice as high for long
maturity bonds compared to short maturity bonds. Ericsson
and Renault (2006) and Feldhu¨tter (in press) ﬁnd that the
liquidity premium due to selling pressure—sales at dis-
counted prices by liquidity-shocked investors—is downward
sloping. Furthermore, Feldhu¨tter (in press) ﬁnds that the
liquidity premium due to search costs, the cost incurred
because it takes time to ﬁnd a counterparty, also is down-
ward sloping. Our contrasting results might be because l is a
combination of liquidity measures, and in addition to selling
pressure and search costs, measures additional aspects of
illiquidity such as liquidity risk. To decompose liquidity
premia into individual components and across maturity is
interesting but outside the scope of this paper.
We also compute the fraction of the liquidity compo-
nent to the total spread. For each bond we proceed as
follows. We deﬁne the bond’s liquidity component as
bRðlitl5tÞ, where l5t is the 5% quantile of the liquidity
measure. The liquidity component is then divided by
the bond’s yield spread and within each group we ﬁnd
the median liquidity fraction. We show in Appendix B that
the size of the liquidity component is robust to the choice
of benchmark riskfree rate, but the liquidity fraction of
the total spread is sensitive to the benchmark. The swap
Table 5
Liquidity component in fraction of spread.
For each rating R, we run the pooled regression
SpreadRit ¼ aRþbRlitþCredit risk controlsitþEit ,
where i refers to bond, t to time, and lit is our liquidity measure. Within each rating we sort increasingly all values of lit and ﬁnd the 5% value l5. For each
bond we deﬁne the liquidity fraction of the total spread as bRðlitl5Þ=SpreadRit . The estimated fractions in the table are for each entry the median fraction.
Conﬁdence bands are found by a wild cluster bootstrap. The data are U.S. corporate bond transactions from TRACE and the sample period is from 2005:Q1
to 2009:Q2.
Panel A: Liquidity component in fraction of spread, pre-subprime (2005:Q1–2007:Q1)
Maturity 0–1y 1–2y 2–3y 3–4y 4–5y 5–8y 8–10y 10–30y
Fraction in pct 3
ð2;4Þ
7
ð4;9Þ
13
ð8;17Þ
13
ð8;18Þ
13
ð8;17Þ
11
ð7;15Þ
8
ð5;11Þ
10
ð7;14Þ
Number of observations 1596 1613 1241 891 641 1187 578 1218
Rating AAA AA A BBB Spec
Fraction in pct 3
ð2;5Þ
4
ð2;7Þ
11
ð5;18Þ
8
ð3;12Þ
24
ð18;30Þ
Number of observations 533 1869 4148 1340 1075
Panel B: Liquidity component in fraction of spread, post-subprime (2007:Q2–2009:Q2)
Maturity 0–1y 1–2y 2–3y 3–4y 4–5y 5–8y 8–10y 10–30y
Fraction in pct 11
ð7;14Þ
20
ð13;27Þ
23
ð15;31Þ
27
ð18;38Þ
31
ð20;42Þ
44
ð28;60Þ
33
ð21;44Þ
43
ð28;53Þ
Number of observations 809 819 675 657 556 817 568 598
Rating AAA AA A BBB Spec
Fraction in pct 7
ð1;12Þ
42
ð23;60Þ
26
ð14;39Þ
29
ð16;41Þ
23
ð16;30Þ
Number of observations 414 1549 2533 539 464
10 To support this claim, we additionally sorted according to bond
age (older and younger than two years). After this sort, the dip at the
8–10y maturity was not present. Results are available on request.
11 The results become unstable if we split into ﬁner rating cate-
gories. While the quantiles of l can be determined reasonably well, the
regression coefﬁcient bRt becomes noisy.
J. Dick-Nielsen et al. / Journal of Financial Economics 103 (2012) 471–492480rate is chosen because there is mounting evidence that
swap rates are better proxies for riskfree rates than
Treasury yields (see, for example, Hull, Predescu, and
White, 2004; Feldhu¨tter and Lando, 2008).
Table 5 shows the fraction of the liquidity component to
the total corporate-swap spread. The ﬁrst parts of Panels A
and B sort according to rating. We see that the fraction of
spreads due to illiquidity is small for investment grade bonds,
11% or less. Using the ratio of the swap basis relative to the
total spread, Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis (2005) ﬁnd the
fraction of spread due to liquidity at the 5-year maturity to
be 2%, while Han and Zhou (2008) ﬁnd it to be 19% consistent
with our ﬁnding that it is relatively small. In speculative
grade bonds the fraction due to liquidity is 24%. Post-
subprime, the fractions increase and range from 23% to 42%
in all ratings but AAA where it is only 7%. That the liquidity
fractions of spreads in AAA are small in percent relative to
other bonds underscores that there is a ﬂight-to-quality
effect in AAA bonds. A consistent ﬁnding from Tables 4 and
5 is that for investment grade bonds the importance of
liquidity has increased after the onset of the subprime crisis
both in absolute size (basis points) and relative to credit risk
(fraction of spread). For speculative grade bonds the liquidity
component in basis points has increased but it is stable
measured as the fraction of total yield spread.
The last parts of Panels A and B in Table 5 show the
liquidity fraction of total spread as a function of maturity.
We introduce a ﬁne maturity grid but do not sort accord-
ing to rating to have a reasonable sample size in each
bucket. We see that the fraction of the spread due to
liquidity is small at short maturities and becomes larger
as maturity increases. This is the case both pre- and post-
subprime, although the fraction is higher post-subprime
for all maturities. For example, post-subprime, thefraction of spread due to liquidity is 43% for bonds with
a maturity more than ten years while it is 11% for
maturities less than one year. The fraction increases at
maturities shorter than ﬁve years and thereafter ﬂattens.
The slight dip at the 8–10y maturity both pre- and post-
subprime is due to an on-the-run effect; many bonds are
issued with a maturity of ten years and are more liquid
right after issuance.10
We ﬁnd strong differences in the pre- and post-subprime
periods, and to examine the variation within the two periods
more closely, we estimate monthly variations in liquidity
and spreads as follows. Each month we (a) ﬁnd a regression
coefﬁcient bt by regressing spreads on l while controlling
for credit risk, (b) calculate for each bond the fraction due to
illiquidity, btðlitl5tÞ=spreadit , (c) ﬁnd the median fraction,
and (d) multiply this fraction by the median spread. This
gives us the total liquidity premium in basis points on a
monthly basis. We do this for investment grade and spec-
ulative grade bonds separately.11 This measures the amount
of the total spread that is due to illiquidity. Fig. 3 shows the
time-series variation in the median spread and the amount
of the spread due to illiquidity.
The liquidity premium in investment grade bonds is
persistent and steadily increasing during the subprime crisis
and peaks in the ﬁrst quarter of 2009 when stock prices
decreased strongly. We see that the co-movement between
the liquidity premium and credit spread is quite high. For
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Fig. 3. Liquidity premium and total spread for investment grade and speculative grade bonds. This graph shows for investment grade and speculative
grade yield spreads the variation over time in the amount of the spread that is due to illiquidity and the total yield spread. On a monthly basis, the
fraction of the yield spread that is due to illiquidity is calculated as explained in Section 4.3. This fraction multiplied by the median yield spread is the
amount of the spread due to illiquidity and plotted along with the median yield spread. The data are U.S. corporate bond transactions from TRACE and the
sample period is from 2005:Q1 to 2009:Q2.
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around the bankruptcy of Lehman and shows less persis-
tence. Furthermore, the co-movement between the liquidity
premium and the spread is less pronounced than for
investment grade bonds, and the premium at the end of
the sample period is almost down to pre-crisis levels even
though the spread is still higher than before the crisis.
5. Determinants of bond illiquidity
In this section, we use our measure of liquidity to
document some key mechanisms by which corporate bondilliquidity is affected. Speciﬁcally, we focus on the liquidity
of bonds with a lead underwriter in ﬁnancial distress, the
liquidity of bonds issued by ﬁnancial ﬁrms relative to bonds
issued by industrial ﬁrms, and liquidity betas.
5.1. Lead underwriter
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) provide a model that
links an asset’s market liquidity and traders’ funding liquid-
ity, and ﬁnd that when funding liquidity is tight, traders
become reluctant to take on positions, especially ‘capital
intensive’ positions in high-margin securities. This lowers
J. Dick-Nielsen et al. / Journal of Financial Economics 103 (2012) 471–492482market liquidity. Empirical support for this prediction is
found in Comerton-Forde, Hendershott, Jones, Moulton, and
Seasholes (2010) who ﬁnd for equities traded on NYSE that
balance sheet and income statement variables for market
makers explain time variation in liquidity.
Since the TRACE data do not reveal the identity of the
traders, we cannot perform direct tests of the Brunnermeier
and Pedersen (2009)-model for the U.S. corporate bond
market. However, if we assume that the original under-
writer is more likely to make a market as is the case in
equity markets, see Ellis, Michaely, and O’Hara (2000), we
can provide indirect evidence by observing bond liquidity of
bonds underwritten by Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers,
two ﬁnancial institutions in distress during the subprime
crisis. We therefore calculate for all bonds with Lehman
Brothers as lead underwriter their average l—weighted by
amount outstanding—on a monthly basis. Likewise, we do
this for bonds with Bear Stearns as lead underwriter and for
all other bonds that are not included in the Bear Stearns and
Lehman samples. We obtain underwriter information fromJan05 Apr05 Jul05 Oct05 Jan06 Apr06 Jul06 Oct06 Jan07 A
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Fig. 4. Illiquidity of bonds underwritten by Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns
Lehman Brothers as lead underwriter, bonds with Bear Stearns as lead unde
transactions from TRACE and the sample period is from 2005:Q1 to 2009:Q
measure l is calculated each month and a monthly weighted average is calcula
the time series of monthly averages. Likewise, a time series of monthly averages
bonds that are not included in the Lehman and Bear Stearns samples. Higher vthe Fixed Income Securities Database (FISD). The results are
plotted in Fig. 4.
The liquidity of bonds with Bear Stearns as lead under-
writer was roughly the same as an average bond entering in
the summer of 2007. During the week of July 16, 2007, Bear
Stearns disclosed that two of their hedge funds had lost
nearly all of the value, and the graph shows that the
‘illiquidity gap’ between Bear Stearns underwritten bonds
and average bonds increased that month. On August 6, Bear
Stearns said that it was weathering the worst storm in
ﬁnancial markets in more than 20 years, in November 2007
Bear Stearns wrote down $1.62 billion and booked a fourth
quarter loss, and in December 2007 there was a further
write-down of $1.90 billion. During these months, the
‘illiquidity gap’ steadily increased. Bear Stearns was in
severe liquidity problems in the beginning of March, and
they were taken over by JP Morgan on March 16. In this
month the ‘illiquidity gap’ peaked but returned to zero in
June 2008 after Bear Stearns shareholders approved JP
Morgan’s buyout of the investment bank on May 29.pr07 Jul07 Oct07 Jan08 Apr08 Jul08 Oct08 Jan09 Apr09
. This graph shows the time-series variation in illiquidity of bonds with
rwriter, and the rest of the sample. The data are U.S. corporate bond
2. For every bond underwritten by Lehman Brothers, their (il)liquidity
ted using amount outstanding for each bond as weight. The graph shows
is calculated for bonds with Bear Stearns as a lead underwriter and for all
alues on the y-axis imply more illiquid bonds.
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Bear Stearns’ trading business, and the ‘illiquidity gap’
returning to zero is consistent with the market’s perception
of JP Morgan as being well-capitalized.
The liquidity of bonds underwritten by Lehman was
close to the liquidity of an average bond in the market up
until August 2008, but this changed when the ‘illiquidity
gap’ between Lehman underwritten bonds and average
market bonds increased strongly in response to Lehman
ﬁling for bankruptcy on September 15. On September 17,
Barclays announced that it acquired Lehman’s North
American trading unit. The gap stayed at high levels
during the rest of the sample period showing that after
the Lehman default, bonds they had underwritten became
permanently more illiquid. This suggests that a bank-
ruptcy (Lehman) has a permanent effect on the illiquidity
of underwritten bonds while a takeover (Bear Stearns) has
a temporary effect. The permanent effect caused by bank-
ruptcy might be because the default left Barclays with
more pressing issues after the acquisition than resuming
market-making activities linked to underwritten bonds.
Another contributing factor could be that a counterparty
with which Lehman had a relationship as broker was more
likely to hold bonds underwritten by Lehman. These bonds
might be held by Lehman as collateral if Lehman ﬁnanced
the counterparty. After the default the collateral could
not easily be returned, as explained in Aragon and Strahan
(in press), and therefore could not be traded by the counter-
party leading to a loss in market liquidity in that bond.
Aragon and Strahan (in press) study hedge funds with a
broker relationship with Lehman. Consistent with our ﬁnd-
ings, they ﬁnd (a) a permanent loss in liquidity of assets
traded by these hedge funds after the Lehman default, and
(b) no permanent effect during the Bear Stearns takeover in
the case of Bear Stearns being the broker.12
5.2. Industry
The yield spreads on bonds issued by ﬁnancial ﬁrms
peaked around key events of the subprime crisis. Concerns
about the credit quality of ﬁnancial ﬁrms were of course a
main driver behind these spread widenings, but it is con-
ceivable that deteriorating liquidity of their bond issues was
also a factor. We address this issue by calculating an average
(weighted by amount outstanding) monthly l of ﬁnancial
and industrial ﬁrms, respectively, and plotting the time-
series behavior in Fig. 5. We obtain bond issuer character-
istics from FISD.
In general, there is little systematic difference. For both
ﬁnancial and industrial bonds, illiquidity goes up at the onset
of the crisis. There are, however, additional spikes in illiquid-
ity for ﬁnancial ﬁrms around the takeover of Bear Stearns in
March 2008, around the Lehman bankruptcy in September
2008, and around the stock market decline in the ﬁrst12 In results not reported we have also looked at bonds under-
written by Merrill Lynch. In these bonds there is an increase in illiquidity
relative to other bonds in the months leading up to September 2008
when Merrill Lynch was taken over by Bank of America. After the
takeover, this ‘run-up’ disappears so the effect is temporary as in the
Bear Stearns case. A graph is available on request.quarter of 2009. That is, in times of severe ﬁnancial distress,
illiquidity of ﬁnancial bonds increases relative to that of
industrial bonds, while in other times liquidity is similar. This
pattern might be due to the heightened information asym-
metry regarding the state of the ﬁnancial ﬁrms—including
their ﬁnancial linkages—around the dramatic events.
By calculating monthly averages, we are able to draw
more high-frequency inferences compared to Longstaff,
Mithal, and Neis (2005) and Friewald, Jankowitsch, and
Subrahmanyam (forthcoming). If we average l over
longer periods of time, as in the approach taken in those
two papers, the effects we ﬁnd would be washed out. Our
results therefore reconcile the ﬁnding in Longstaff, Mithal,
and Neis (2005) that bonds issued by ﬁnancial ﬁrms are
more illiquid with the ﬁnding in Friewald, Jankowitsch,
and Subrahmanyam (forthcoming) that there is no sys-
tematic liquidity difference.
5.3. Liquidity betas
We estimate bond-speciﬁc liquidity betas by calculat-
ing a monthly time series of corporate bond market
illiquidity, and for each bond estimate the correlation
between market-wide illiquidity and bond-speciﬁc illi-
quidity. The market-wide time series is calculated by
averaging on a monthly basis across all observations of
bond-speciﬁc li using amount outstanding as weight.
Bond-speciﬁc beta is estimated through the slope coefﬁ-
cient in the regression of bond-speciﬁc li on market-wide
l, where the regression is based on all months where a
bond-speciﬁc li can be calculated. We calculate the betas
using the whole sample period 2005Q1–2009Q2, because
estimating betas separately for the pre- and post-sub-
prime periods leads to noisier estimates. Once we have
estimated a liquidity beta using the complete sample
period, we examine the dependence of spreads on this
beta in the two subperiods.
For each rating class R, pooled regressions are run
where yield spreads are regressed on each bond’s liquidity
b and our liquidity measure lt with credit risk controls:
SpreadRit ¼ aRþgR1litþgR2biþCredit risk controlsitþEit ,
where i is for bond in rating R and t is time measured in
quarters.
The result of the regression is reported in Table 6. Our
regressions are run both ‘marginally’, i.e., with the liquid-
ity beta as the only regressor in addition to the credit risk
controls, and with our liquidity measure included as an
additional regressor.
Both marginally and with l included, there is no
signiﬁcance pre-subprime except for the AAA-category.
After the onset of the crisis, the picture changes and only
spreads in the AAA-category do not depend on the
liquidity beta. This is consistent with the regime-depen-
dent importance of liquidity betas noted in Acharya,
Amihud, and Bharath (2010). But whereas they use stock
and Treasury bond market liquidity to measure aggregate
liquidity, our measure speciﬁcally captures corporate
bond market liquidity.
We saw in the previous section that the contribution
to spreads of liquidity was small for AAA bonds after the
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Fig. 5. Illiquidity of bonds of industrial and ﬁnancial ﬁrms. This graph shows the time-series variation in illiquidity of bonds of industrial and ﬁnancial
ﬁrms. The data are U.S. corporate bond transactions from TRACE and the sample period is from 2005:Q1 to 2009:Q2. For every bond issued by a ﬁnancial
ﬁrm, their (il)liquidity measure l is calculated each month and a monthly weighted average is calculated using amount outstanding for each bond as
weight. The graph shows the time series of monthly averages. Likewise, a time series of monthly averages is calculated for bonds issued by industrial
ﬁrms. Higher values on the y-axis imply more illiquid bonds.
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coefﬁcient for AAA in the crisis period conﬁrms that there
is a ﬂight-to-quality effect in AAA-rated bonds.
6. Robustness checks
In Appendix B we carry out a series of robustness checks.
We test for potential endogeneity bias and ﬁnd that endo-
geneity is not a major concern. We calculate liquidity premia
using corporate bond spreads to Treasury rates instead of
swap rates and ﬁnd that our conclusions still hold. And we
examine an alternative deﬁnition of our liquidity component
and ﬁnd results to be robust to this deﬁnition.
As a further test showing that our regression results
are robust, we employ a different methodology for con-
trolling for credit risk. The idea is that any yield spread
difference between two ﬁxed-rate bullet bonds with the
same maturity and issued by the same ﬁrm must be due
to liquidity differences and not differences in credit risk.
This intuition is formalized in the following regression.
We conduct rating-wise ‘paired’ regressions of yieldspreads on dummy variables and one liquidity measure
at a time. The regression is
SpreadRit ¼DummyRGtþbRlitþEit ,
where DummyRGt is the same for all bonds with the same
rating R and approximately the same maturity. The grid of
maturities is 0–0.5y, 0.5–1y, 1–3y, 3–5y, 5–7y, 7–10y, and
more than 10y. For example, if ﬁrm i in quarter t has three
bonds issued with maturities 5y, 5.5y, and 6y, the bonds
have the same dummy in that quarter, and we assume
that any yield spread difference between the bonds is due
to liquidity. There are separate dummies for each quarter.
Once we have dummied out credit risk in the regressions,
estimated coefﬁcients for the liquidity measure are not
inconsistent because of possibly omitted credit risk
variables. Hence, the paired regression is free of any
endogeneity bias due to credit risk. Only groups with
two or more spreads contribute to the liquidity coefﬁcient
reducing the sample compared to former regressions.
Therefore, we only look at two rating groups, investment
grade and speculative grade. Table 7 shows the regression
Table 6
Beta regressions.
For each rating class R, pooled regressions are run where yield spreads
are regressed on each bond’s liquidity b and our liquidity measure lt
with credit risk controls:
SpreadRit ¼ aRþgR1litþgR2biþCredit risk controlsitþEit ,
where i is for bond in rating R and t is time measured in quarter. Each
bond’s bi is calculated as the covariance between this bond’s monthly lit
and a size-weighted monthly market lMt . Two regressions for each rating
pre- and post-subprime are run; one with only b included and one with
both b and l included. The pre-subprime period is 2005:Q1–2007:Q1 while
the post-subprime period is 2007:Q2–2009:Q2. The data are U.S. corporate
bond transactions from TRACE. Standard errors are corrected for time-
series effects, ﬁrm ﬁxed effects, and heteroskedasticity, and signiﬁcance at
10% level is marked n, at 5% marked nn, and at 1% marked nnn.
Pre-subprime Post-subprime
b l b l
AAA 0:0034
ð1:34Þ
0:0085
ð0:84Þ
0:0056nnn
ð3:26Þ
0:0033nnn
ð2:65Þ
0:0159
ð1:26Þ 0:0234
nn
ð2:38Þ
AA 0:0012
ð0:23Þ 0:1823
n
ð1:94Þ
0:0067
ð1:06Þ
0:0017
ð0:60Þ 0:1720
nn
ð2:14Þ
0:1712nnn
ð3:82Þ
A 0:0004
ð0:14Þ 0:2631
nn
ð2:22Þ
0:0021
ð0:65Þ 0:0106
nn
ð2:57Þ
0:2314nn
ð2:15Þ
0:1211nn
ð2:03Þ
BBB 0:0044
ð1:34Þ 0:2171
nnn
ð4:05Þ
0:0012
ð0:34Þ 0:0254
nnn
ð4:33Þ
0:3187nnn
ð3:44Þ
0:3242nnn
ð2:91Þ
Spec 0:0102
ð0:90Þ 1:3538
nnn
ð2:60Þ
0:0162
ð1:31Þ 0:1502
nnn
ð4:64Þ
1:3140nn
ð2:73Þ
0:4155nnn
ð7:08Þ
Table 7
Paired regression.
We pair bonds from the same ﬁrm with similar maturity and regress
their yield spreads on liquidity variables one at a time and add a dummy
for a given ﬁrm and maturity combination. Since bonds with similar
maturity and issued by the same ﬁrm have similar credit risk character-
istics, the dummy controls for credit risk. Signiﬁcance at 10% level is
marked n, at 5% marked nn, and at 1% marked nnn. The data are U.S.
corporate bond transactions from TRACE and the sample period is from
2005:Q1 to 2009:Q2.
Pre-subprime Post-subprime
Investment Speculative Investment Speculative
l 0:01nnn
ð3:79Þ
0:09nn
ð2:43Þ
0:12nnn
ð3:58Þ
0:41n
ð1:95Þ
Amihud 2:26nnn
ð5:11Þ
16:80nnn
ð3:51Þ
16:10nnn
ð3:04Þ
54:65
ð1:54Þ
Roll 0:03nnn
ð3:56Þ
0:16nn
ð2:54Þ
0:05nn
ð2:14Þ
0:39
ð1:44Þ
Bond zero 0:00nnn
ð5:85Þ
0:01nn
ð2:28Þ
0:00
ð0:78Þ
0:03
ð1:12Þ
Turnover 0:11n
ð1:87Þ
1:48n
ð1:72Þ
3:21
ð1:46Þ
72:74
ð1:63Þ
IRC 8:48nnn
ð3:72Þ
125:03nn
ð2:55Þ
104:34nn
ð2:43Þ
95:04
ð0:58Þ
IRC risk 1:30
ð0:69Þ 57:15
nn
ð2:15Þ
39:09nnn
ð2:97Þ
103:42
ð0:74Þ
Amihud risk 0:64nnn
ð4:21Þ
9:44nnn
ð2:79Þ
6:56nnn
ð3:19Þ
39:63nnn
ð4:60Þ
13 We thank the referee for this suggestion.
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signiﬁcant for both investment grade and speculative
grade bonds in the period before the subprime crisis aswell as after the onset of the crisis. This supports our
ﬁnding that l is successful at disentangling liquidity and
credit risk.
To address the potential concern that our results are
confounded by an increase of new issues towards the end
of the sample period, we calculate the average age of the
bonds in the sample on a monthly basis. We ﬁnd no trend
during the sample period which suggests that our results
are not driven by an increase in bond issues (results are
available on request). We also recalculate the total spread
and liquidity premium in Fig. 3 using only bonds in
existence by February 2005.13 The reduction in the
sample leads to increased noise in our results. To make
it clear how this noise affects our results, we redo the
calculations in two different ways. Recall that for each
bond, the fraction due to illiquidity is calculated as
btðlitl5tÞ=Spreadit , where bt is the liquidity regression
coefﬁcient in month t, lit is the bond-speciﬁc liquidity
level in month t, Spreadit the bond-speciﬁc spread, and l5t is
the 5% liquidity quantile in month t. In the ﬁrst recalcula-
tion, we assume that the sensitivities of spreads to illiquid-
ity are not inﬂuenced by a potential issuance effect, but that
the overall level of illiquidity might be effected. Speciﬁcally,
we use the regression coefﬁcients bt obtained using the full
sample, while calculating lit , Spreadit, and l5t using the
reduced sample (bonds in existence by February 2005).
Fig. 6 shows the results along with those in Fig. 3 (‘results in
the paper’, respectively, ‘reduced sample, ﬁxed reg. coeff.’).
There is little difference in the results, so results based on l
are robust to using only bonds issued by February 2005. In
particular, this implies that our results on underwriter and
ﬁnancial vs. industrial ﬁrms are robust to a possible issu-
ance effect. In our second recalculation, we also recalculate
the regression coefﬁcients bt using only bonds in existence
by February 2005. That is, we redo the whole analysis with
the reduced sample. The results are also in Fig. 6 marked
‘reduced sample’. (Note that the yield spreads are the same
for the ‘reduced sample, ﬁxed reg. coeff.’ and ‘reduced
sample’ methods.) We see that results become more noisy,
in particular for speculative grade bonds. For example, the
liquidity component for speculative grade bonds in Novem-
ber 2008 is small. However, the results still show that the
spike and subsequent decline in high yield spreads to a
certain extent was a liquidity issue.7. Conclusion
The subprime crisis dramatically increased corporate
bond spreads and it is widely believed that deteriorating
liquidity contributed to the widening of spreads.
We use a new measure of illiquidity—derived from a
principal component analysis of eight liquidity proxies—to
analyze the contribution of illiquidity to corporate bond
spreads. The measure outperforms the Roll measure used in
Bao, Pan, and Wang (2011) and zero-trading days used in
Chen, Lesmond, and Wei (2007) in explaining spread varia-
tion. In fact, the number of zero-trading days tends to
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Fig. 6. Liquidity premium and total spread for investment grade and speculative grade bonds using only bonds in existence by February 2005. On a
monthly basis, the fraction of the yield spread that is due to illiquidity is calculated as btðlitl5tÞ=Spreadit (as explained in Section 4.3. This fraction
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transactions from TRACE and the sample period is from 2005:Q1 to 2009:Q2.
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bonds are split into trades of smaller size.
Before the crisis, the contribution to spreads was small
for investment grade bonds both measured in basis points
and as a fraction of total spreads. The contribution
increased strongly at the onset of the crisis for all bonds
except AAA-rated bonds, which is consistent with a ﬂight-
to-quality into AAA-rated bonds. Liquidity premia ininvestment grade bonds rose steadily during the crisis
and peaked when the stock market declined strongly in
the ﬁrst quarter of 2009, while premia in speculative
grade bonds peaked during the Lehman default and
returned almost to pre-crisis levels in mid-2009.
Our measure is useful for analyzing other aspects of
corporate bond liquidity. We show that the ﬁnancial
distress of Lehman and Bear Stearns diminished the
J. Dick-Nielsen et al. / Journal of Financial Economics 103 (2012) 471–492 487liquidity of the bonds for which they served as lead
underwriters. We also compare the liquidity of bonds
issued by ﬁnancial ﬁrms with that of bonds issued by
industrial ﬁrms. Bonds issued by ﬁnancial ﬁrms have
spikes of illiquidity around the take-over of Bear Stearns,
the collapse of Lehman, and the March 2009 rapid stock
market decline.
From the covariation between an individual bond’s
liquidity and market-wide liquidity, we deﬁne a measure
of systematic illiquidity. This measure is shown to have little
effect on spreads before the onset of the crisis, but it has a
positive effect for all but AAA-rated bonds after the onset of
the crisis. This is consistent with the regime-dependent role
of liquidity betas found in Acharya, Amihud, and Bharath
(2010), but it reﬁnes their ﬂight-to-quality ﬁnding from
general investment grade to AAA-rated bonds only.
Appendix A. Implementation details
In this appendix we describe in detail the implementa-
tion of the individual liquidity measures used in the main
text and how we calculate corporate bond spreads. We
winsorize the 0.5% highest values of every liquidity
variable, meaning that all values above the 99.5% percen-
tile are set to the 99.5% percentile. For corporate bond
spreads we winsorize the 0.5% highest and lowest spreads
as explained below.
A.1. Corporate bond spreads
We calculate the quarter-end yield as the average yield
for all trades on the last day in the quarter where the
bond traded. If a bond did not trade during the last month
of the quarter, it is excluded from that quarter. Yield
spreads are calculated as the difference between the bond
yield and the interpolated maturity-matched swap rate
calculated on the same day as the yield is measured. We
exclude yield spreads for bonds that have less than one
month to maturity or have a time to maturity when
issued of more than 30 years. We winsorize the 0.5%
highest and lowest spreads, so all spreads above the 99.5%
percentile are set to the 99.5% percentile and all spreads
below the 0.5% percentile are set to the 0.5% percentile.
A.2. Amihud measure
Amihud (2002) constructs an illiquidity measure based
on the theoretical model of Kyle (1985) and we use a
slightly modiﬁed version of this measure. It measures the
price impact of a trade per unit traded. For each corporate
bond, the measure is the daily average of absolute returns
rj divided by the trade size Qj (in million $) of consecutive
transactions:
Amihudt ¼ 1
Nt
XNt
j ¼ 1
9rj9
Qj
¼ 1
Nt
XNt
j ¼ 1
PjPj1
Pj1


Qj
,
where Nt is the number of returns on day t. At least two
transactions are required on a given day to calculate themeasure, and we deﬁne a quarterly Amihud measure by
taking the median of daily measures within the quarter.
A.3. Roll measure
Roll (1984) ﬁnds that under certain assumptions, the
percentage bid–ask spread equals two times the square root
of minus the covariance between consecutive returns:
Rollt ¼ 2
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
covðRi,Ri1Þ
p
,
where t is the time period for which the measure is
calculated. If the covariance is negative, the observation is
discarded. The intuition is that the bond price bounces back
and forth between the bid and the ask price, and higher
percentage bid–ask spreads lead to higher negative covar-
iance between consecutive returns. We deﬁne a daily Roll
measure on days with at least one transaction using a
rolling window of 21 trading days, and the measure is only
well-deﬁned if there are at least four transactions in the
window. We deﬁne a quarterly Roll measure by taking the
median of daily measures within the quarter.
A.4. Imputed roundtrip cost
Feldhu¨tter (in press) proposes an alternative measure of
transaction costs based on what he calls Imputed Roundtrip
Trades. The intuition is the following. Often, we see a
corporate bond trading two or three times within a very
short period of time after a longer period with no trades.
This is likely to occur because a dealer matches a buyer and
a seller and collects the bid–ask spread as a fee. When the
dealer has found a match, a trade between seller and dealer
along with a trade between buyer and dealer are carried out.
Possibly, the matching occurs through a second dealer in
which case there is also a transaction between the two
dealers. If two or three trades in a given bond with the same
trade size take place on the same day, and there are no other
trades with the same size on that day, we deﬁne the
transactions as part of an IRT. For an IRT we deﬁne the
imputed roundtrip cost (IRC) as
PmaxPmin
Pmax
,
where Pmax is the largest price in the IRT and Pmin is the
smallest price in the IRT. A daily estimate of roundtrip costs
is the average of roundtrip costs on that day for different
trade sizes, and we estimate quarterly roundtrip costs by
averaging over daily estimates. Feldhu¨tter (in press) exam-
ines the properties of IRTs in detail, including how much of
total trading volume is captured, and for a subsample of
TRACE data with buy–sell indicators available, to what
extent IRTs capture full roundtrip costs.
A.5. Turnover
We also consider the quarterly turnover of bonds:
Turnovert ¼ Total trading volumet
Amount outstanding
,
where t is the quarter. We can interpret the inverse of
the turnover as the average holding time of the bond, i.e.,
Table B1
Endogeneity tests.
For each rating class R and each liquidity variable L, we test for
potential endogeneity bias by using a Durbin-Wu-Hausman test. In total,
45 tests are run (nine liquidity variablesﬁve rating classes) pre- and
post-subprime. This table shows for each test the t-statistics and R2 for
the ﬁrst-stage regression in parentheses. The data are U.S. corporate
bond transactions from TRACE and the sample period is from 2005:Q1 to
2009:Q2. Panel A shows the coefﬁcients using data before the subprime
crisis, while Panel B shows the coefﬁcients using data after the onset of
the subprime crisis. Signiﬁcance at 10% level is marked n, at 5% marked
nn, and at 1% marked nnn.
Panel A: Endogeneity tests, pre-subprime (2005:Q1–2007:Q1)
AAA AA A BBB Spec
l 0:55
ð28%Þ
1:06
ð16%Þ
0:96
ð17%Þ
1:50
ð19%Þ
0:61
ð40%Þ
Amihud 0:43
ð33%Þ
1:00
ð20%Þ
0:98
ð18%Þ
1:31
ð9%Þ
0:71
ð34%Þ
Roll 0:66
ð47%Þ
0:98
ð30%Þ
0:98
ð32%Þ
1:16
ð24%Þ
0:45
ð25%Þ
Firm zero 0:25
ð88%Þ
1:08
ð34%Þ
0:83
ð23%Þ
1:18
ð25%Þ
0:27
ð46%Þ
Bond zero 0:41
ð83%Þ
1:04
ð67%Þ
0:69
ð68%Þ
0:85
ð45%Þ
0:87
ð61%Þ
Turnover 0:18
ð19%Þ
1:13
ð28%Þ
0:86
ð15%Þ
1:05
ð29%Þ
1:04
ð39%Þ
IRC 0:51
ð34%Þ
1:08
ð18%Þ
0:95
ð19%Þ
1:45
ð23%Þ
0:13
ð37%Þ
Amihud risk 0:45
ð19%Þ
1:09
ð10%Þ
0:89
ð11%Þ
1:43
ð13%Þ
0:31
ð31%Þ
IRC risk 0:46
ð13%Þ
1:08
ð12%Þ
0:90
ð11%Þ
1:29
ð14%Þ
0:03
ð33%Þ
Panel B: Endogeneity tests, post-subprime (2007:Q2–2009:Q2)
AAA AA A BBB Spec
l 4:56nnn
ð48%Þ
0:82
ð42%Þ
0:73
ð52%Þ
0:42
ð47%Þ 2:76
nnn
ð63%Þ
Amihud 5:03nnn
ð41%Þ
1:06
ð31%Þ
0:20
ð30%Þ
0:60
ð27%Þ 2:82
nnn
ð42%Þ
Roll 5:24nnn
ð33%Þ
1:15
ð15%Þ
0:51
ð21%Þ
0:77
ð16%Þ 2:89
nnn
ð23%Þ
Firm zero 5:50nnn
ð87%Þ
1:12
ð35%Þ
0:40
ð24%Þ
0:82
ð44%Þ 3:06
nnn
ð58%Þ
Bond zero 6:40nnn
ð79%Þ
1:10
ð73%Þ
0:21
ð70%Þ
0:70
ð68%Þ 3:26
nnn
ð76%Þ
Turnover 6:17nnn
ð27%Þ
1:15
ð16%Þ
0:32
ð17%Þ
0:73
ð20%Þ 2:91
nnn
ð36%Þ
IRC 4:94nnn
ð50%Þ
0:84
ð42%Þ
0:26
ð49%Þ
0:77
ð39%Þ 2:72
nnn
ð63%Þ
Amihud risk 5:07nnn
ð21%Þ
1:05
ð22%Þ
0:36
ð34%Þ
0:59
ð45%Þ 2:69
nnn
ð50%Þ
IRC risk 4:82nnn
ð39%Þ
0:74
ð34%Þ
0:57
ð48%Þ
0:75
ð34%Þ
2:75nnn
ð55%Þ
14 Another potential instrument is amount issued. Since this vari-
able is signiﬁcant in most of the regressions in Table B4, omitting it from
the regressions in the test creates a new endogeneity problem. The tests
in this case would likely show an endogeneity problem even if it is not
there; and if we use amount issued as instrument, this is indeed the
case.
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about three months.
A.6. Zero trading days
We calculate bond zero-trading days as the percentage
of days during a quarter where the bond did not trade. We
also calculate ﬁrm zero-trading days as the percentage of
days during a quarter where none of the issuing ﬁrm’s
bonds traded. Clearly, this is a ﬁrm-speciﬁc rather than a
bond-speciﬁc measure, and it is therefore the same for
different bonds issued by the same ﬁrm.
A.7. Variability of Amihud and imputed roundtrip costs
It is likely that investors consider not only the current
level of bond liquidity but also the possible future levels in
case the investor needs to sell the bond. The variability of
both the Amihud measure and imputed roundtrip costs may
therefore play a role for liquidity spreads. Thus, we include
in our regressions the standard deviations of the daily
Amihud measure and imputed roundtrip costs measured
over one-quarter.
A.8. The measure l
As described in the main text, a principal component
analysis of the liquidity measures leads us to deﬁne a factor
that loads evenly on Amihud, IRC, Amihud risk, and IRC risk.
We call this measure l. To be precise: for each bond i and
quarter t we calculate the measure Ljit , where j¼1,y,4 is an
index for Amihud, IRC, Amihud risk, and IRC risk. We
normalize each measure ~L
j
it ¼ ðLjitmjÞ=sj, where mj and sj
are the mean and standard deviation of Lj across bonds and
quarters and deﬁne our liquidity measure for each bond and
quarter as
lit ¼
X4
j ¼ 1
~L
j
it :
Appendix B. Robustness checks
In this appendix we discuss possible misspeciﬁcation
in our regression analysis. We test for endogeneity, show
that our results are robust to the choice of benchmark
riskfree rate, and show that results are robust to how we
deﬁne the liquidity component. Finally, we show that
only the ﬁrst principal component of the eight liquidity
proxies consistently predicts yield spreads.
B.1. Endogeneity
There may be a two-way causal relationship between
contemporaneous measures of liquidity and credit risk,
and failing to account for such a relationship in regres-
sions results in inconsistent OLS estimates. Our liquidity
measures are lagged in time relative to credit spreads,
since spreads are measured on the last day in each quarter
while liquidity measures are based on transactions during
the quarter. Therefore, simultaneity bias is not a concern.To test for potential endogeneity bias, we use a residual
augmented two-stage least squares t-test as in Davidson and
MacKinnon (1993), equivalent to the Durbin-Wu-Hausman
test. We do this for every marginal regression in Table 3, that
is, test every liquidity variable separately. If the test is not
signiﬁcant, the liquidity variable can be regarded as exogen-
ous. As instrument we use bond age and therefore exclude it
in the yield spread regressions.14 Table B1 shows the R2’s for
the ﬁrst stage regressions and the t-statistic tests for endo-
geneity. Most R2’s are relatively high indicating that the
control variables including the instrument are able to explain
a large portion of the variation in the liquidity measures. Out
Table B2
Liquidity component in basis points when the Treasury rate is used as riskfree rate.
For each rating R, we run the pooled regression
SpreadRit ¼ aRþbRlitþCredit risk controlsitþEit ,
where i refers to bond, t to time, and lit is our liquidity measure. The bond spread is measured with respect to the Treasury yield. Within each rating and
maturity bucket (0–2y, 2–5y, and 5–30y), we sort increasingly all values of lit and ﬁnd the median value l50 and the 5% value l5. The liquidity component
in the bucket is deﬁned as bðl50l5Þ. This table shows for all buckets the liquidity component with standard errors in parentheses. The data are U.S.
corporate bond transactions from TRACE and the sample period is from 2005:Q1 to 2009:Q2. Conﬁdence bands are found by a wild cluster bootstrap.
Panel A: Liquidity component in basis points, pre-subprime (2005Q1–2007:Q1)
Average Liquidity component, basis points Number of observations
0–2y 2–5y 5–30y 0–2y 2–5y 5–30y
AAA 1.6 1:1
ð0:8;1:4Þ
1:7
ð1:2;2:1Þ
2:0
ð1:4;2:5Þ
162 178 193
AA 1.7 1:1
ð0:8;1:5Þ
1:8
ð1:3;2:3Þ
2:3
ð1:6;3:0Þ
704 667 498
A 2.8 1:7
ð0:9;2:6Þ
2:9
ð1:5;4:3Þ
3:8
ð1:9;5:5Þ
1540 1346 1260
BBB 4.0 2:9
ð1:4;4:4Þ
4:1
ð1:9;6:2Þ
4:9
ð2:3;7:3Þ
517 270 553
Spec 57.8 45:2
ð33:9;57:4Þ
44:1
ð33:1;56:0Þ
84:2
ð63:2;106:9Þ
270 324 480
Panel B: Liquidity component in basis points, post-subprime (2007:Q2–2009:Q2)
Average Liquidity component, basis points Number of observations
0–2y 2–5y 5–30y 0–2y 2–5y 5–30y
AAA 1.0 0:5
ð0:3;5:4Þ
0:8
ð0:5;8:1Þ
1:7
ð0:9;16:6Þ
110 149 155
AA 40.6 22:9
ð11:5;35:2Þ
36:1
ð18:2;55:5Þ
63:0
ð31:8;96:8Þ
493 572 483
A 47.6 25:0
ð12:9;37:6Þ
47:9
ð24:7;72:1Þ
70:0
ð36:1;105:4Þ
762 878 890
BBB 94.0 65:2
ð36:0;97:4Þ
117:2
ð64:8;175:1Þ
99:5
ð55:0;148:6Þ
123 159 256
Spec 189.9 119:3
ð79:4;154:9Þ
216:3
ð144:0;280:9Þ
234:2
ð156:0;304:2Þ
133 129 201
15 It might be surprising that the regression coefﬁcients for the ﬁrst
PC are very different from those for l in Table 3. The reason is that the
variance of the ﬁrst principal component is equal to the ﬁrst eigenvalue,
while the variance of l is equal to one.
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indicating that endogeneity is not a major concern.
B.2. Benchmark riskfree rate
The size of the nondefault component in corporate bond
spreads investigated by, among others, Huang and Huang
(2003) and Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis (2005), depends
strongly on the chosen riskfree rate. In Longstaff, Mithal,
and Neis (2005) the difference is around 60bp. As Table B2
shows, the estimated liquidity component when the Treas-
ury rate is used as riskfree rate instead of the swap rate does
not change much. The change in estimated liquidity is often
less than 1bp and is for all rating categories less than 10bp.
Therefore, our ﬁndings on the size of the liquidity premium
in basis points are insensitive to the choice of benchmark
(while our ﬁndings on the fraction out of the total spread of
course depend on the benchmark riskfree rate).
B.3. Alternative deﬁnition of liquidity component
The liquidity component is calculated as the median
minus 5% quantile of the liquidity score and has the natural
interpretation as the liquidity premium of an average bond
in the corporate bond market relative to a very liquid bond.
To check that our main results are robust to the deﬁnition of
the liquidity component, Table B3 shows the liquiditycomponent when it is deﬁned as the 75% quantile minus
5% quantile. The component in this table can be interpreted
as that of an illiquid bond relative to a very liquid bond.
Table B3 shows that the liquidity component is larger for an
illiquid bond compared to an average bond (which by
deﬁnition must be the case). Also, Table B3 shows that the
main results of the paper are unchanged: liquidity premia
are increasing in maturity, the liquidity premium is higher
post-subprime compared to pre-subprime, and the liquidity
premium for investment grade bonds is small pre-subprime.
B.4. Higher-order principal components
In the main text we base our deﬁnition of l on the ﬁrst
principal component of eight liquidity proxies and argue
that l is a more consistent proxy for liquidity compared to
the individual measures. It might be the case that some of
the other principal components contain important infor-
mation about liquidity, so Table B4 shows the regression
in Eq. (1) with all eight principal components included.15
For completeness, the coefﬁcients of the credit risk con-
trols are also shown in the table.
Table B3
Liquidity component in basis points for an illiquid bond.
For each rating R, we run the pooled regression
SpreadRit ¼ aRþbRlitþCredit risk controlsitþEit ,
where i refers to bond, t to time, and lit is our liquidity measure. The bond spread is measured with respect to the swap rate. Within each rating and
maturity bucket (0–2y, 2–5y, and 5–30y), we sort increasingly all values of lit and ﬁnd the 75% value l75 and the 5% value l5. The liquidity component in
the bucket is deﬁned as bðl75l5Þ. This table shows for all buckets the liquidity component with standard errors in parentheses. The data are U.S.
corporate bond transactions from TRACE and the sample period is from 2005:Q1 to 2009:Q2. Conﬁdence bands are found by a wild cluster bootstrap.
Panel A: Liquidity component in basis points, pre-subprime (2005Q1–2007:Q1)
Average Liquidity component, basis points Number of observations
0–2y 2–5y 5–30y 0–2y 2–5y 5–30y
AAA 1.4 1:0
ð0:5;1:3Þ
1:2
ð0:7;1:7Þ
2:0
ð1:1;2:8Þ
162 178 193
AA 1.7 1:1
ð0:4;1:7Þ
1:6
ð0:6;2:6Þ
2:4
ð0:9;3:8Þ
704 667 498
A 4.4 2:8
ð1:2;4:3Þ
4:3
ð1:8;6:8Þ
6:1
ð2:6;9:6Þ
1540 1346 1260
BBB 8.4 5:8
ð2:4;9:1Þ
8:9
ð3:6;13:9Þ
10:4
ð4:2;16:3Þ
517 270 553
Spec 117.1 81:5
ð61:2;104:4Þ
90:4
ð67:9;115:8Þ
179:4
ð134:6;229:6Þ
270 324 480
Panel B: Liquidity component in basis points, post-subprime (2007:Q2–2009:Q2)
Average Liquidity component, basis points Number of observations
0–2y 2–5y 5–30y 0–2y 2–5y 5–30y
AAA 9.2 4:4
ð0:9;7:9Þ
8:0
ð1:7;14:2Þ
15:2
ð3:2;27:3Þ
110 149 155
AA 68.5 37:8
ð21:2;53:4Þ
64:0
ð35:8;90:5Þ
103:9
ð58:1;146:9Þ
493 572 483
A 92.6 53:8
ð29:4;78:8Þ
95:9
ð52:5;140:6Þ
128:1
ð70:1;187:7Þ
762 878 890
BBB 176.5 138:6
ð76:0;203:3Þ
201:6
ð110:5;295:6Þ
189:4
ð103:8;277:8Þ
123 159 256
Spec 420.5 294:0
ð196:2;383:0Þ
390:5
ð260:6;508:7Þ
577:1
ð385:2;751:8Þ
133 129 201
Table B4
Liquidity regressions with eight liquidity PCs.
For each of the ﬁve rating classes, a pooled regression with quarterly observations is run with variables measuring both liquidity and credit risk. Panel
A shows the regression coefﬁcients and t-statistics in parentheses when using data from 2005:Q1 to 2007:Q1, while Panel B shows the results for data
from 2007:Q2 to 2009:Q2. The data are U.S. corporate bond transactions from TRACE. Standard errors are corrected for time series effects, ﬁrm ﬁxed
effects, and heteroskedasticity, and signiﬁcance at 10% level is marked n, at 5% marked nn, and at 1% marked nnn.
Panel A: Pre-subprime (2005:Q1–2007:Q1)
AAA AA A BBB Spec
Intercept 0:4
ð1:24Þ
0:2
ð1:20Þ
0:5
ð1:62Þ 2:2
nnn
ð2:84Þ
0:1
ð0:03Þ
1PC 0:01nnn
ð3:22Þ
0:02nnn
ð12:31Þ
0:03nnn
ð3:28Þ
0:05nnn
ð2:88Þ
0:30nnn
ð5:65Þ
2PC 0:01
ð0:58Þ
0:00
ð0:09Þ 0:04
nnn
ð3:41Þ
0:06
ð1:30Þ
0:19
ð1:19Þ
3PC 0:014nnn
ð4:20Þ
0:006
ð0:72Þ 0:018
nnn
ð2:66Þ
0:005
ð0:21Þ
0:093
ð0:88Þ
4PC 0:020nn
ð2:32Þ
0:022nnn
ð2:94Þ
0:002
ð0:18Þ
0:015
ð0:67Þ 0:112
n
ð1:92Þ
5PC 0:00
ð0:01Þ 0:02
nnn
ð3:08Þ
0:03n
ð1:88Þ
0:05
ð1:22Þ
0:02
ð0:16Þ
6PC 0:00
ð0:69Þ
0:01
ð0:81Þ 0:03
nnn
ð4:19Þ
0:03
ð0:65Þ 0:24
n
ð1:91Þ
7PC 0:00
ð0:27Þ
0:00
ð0:28Þ
0:00
ð0:55Þ 0:02
n
ð1:70Þ
0:10n
ð1:68Þ
8PC 0:02nnn
ð3:07Þ
0:02
ð1:43Þ
0:01
ð0:74Þ 0:23
nnn
ð2:58Þ
0:17
ð1:56Þ
Age 0:00
ð0:08Þ
0:00
ð0:96Þ
0:00
ð1:12Þ
0:01
ð1:26Þ
0:00
ð0:12Þ
Amount issued 0:025nnn
ð3:52Þ
0:012
ð1:34Þ 0:032
nn
ð2:57Þ
0:108nnn
ð2:65Þ
0:143
ð0:87Þ
Forecast dispersion 3:05
ð1:64Þ
0:02
ð1:30Þ 0:73
nn
ð2:12Þ
0:65nn
ð2:04Þ
1:21
ð1:37Þ
Coupon 0:02nn
ð1:99Þ
0:02nnn
ð4:00Þ
0:01n
ð1:79Þ
0:07nnn
ð4:46Þ
0:29nnn
ð3:62Þ
10y Swap 0:05n
ð1:82Þ
0:03nnn
ð3:76Þ
0:05nnn
ð4:23Þ
0:06nnn
ð4:03Þ
0:26
ð1:33Þ
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Table B4 (continued )
Panel A: Pre-subprime (2005:Q1–2007:Q1)
10y–1y Swap 0:005
ð0:79Þ 0:030
nn
ð2:28Þ
0:020nnn
ð2:89Þ
0:107nnn
ð5:31Þ
0:132
ð0:44Þ
Equity vol 0:002
ð0:33Þ 0:008
nnn
ð15:21Þ
0:006n
ð1:68Þ
0:011nnn
ð4:17Þ
0:093nnn
ð5:88Þ
Pretax1 0:344nnn
ð3:53Þ
0:023nnn
ð2:88Þ
0:010
ð0:57Þ
0:026
ð1:36Þ
0:027
ð0:44Þ
Pretax2 0:051nnn
ð3:06Þ
0:016nnn
ð4:90Þ
0:011n
ð1:90Þ
0:013
ð1:54Þ
0:068
ð0:90Þ
Pretax3 0:007
ð1:00Þ
0:000
ð0:18Þ
0:001
ð0:35Þ 0:011
nn
ð2:18Þ
0:048
ð0:95Þ
Pretax4 0:003nnn
ð3:78Þ
0:000
ð0:03Þ
0:000
ð0:26Þ 0:005
nnn
ð3:31Þ
0:022
ð1:30Þ
Sales to income 0:002
ð1:14Þ
0:000
ð0:53Þ
0:000
ð0:01Þ 0:005
nn
ð2:14Þ
0:003nn
ð1:97Þ
Long term debt to asset 0:016nn
ð2:49Þ
0:002nnn
ð4:13Þ
0:001
ð1:16Þ 0:008
nnn
ð2:92Þ
0:001
ð0:02Þ
Leverage ratio 0:009nnn
ð3:04Þ
0:001
ð1:58Þ
0:001
ð1:00Þ
0:000
ð0:10Þ
0:023
ð0:91Þ
Time-to-maturity 0:016nnn
ð3:50Þ
0:019nnn
ð18:21Þ
0:022nnn
ð15:21Þ
0:040nnn
ð7:95Þ
0:043nnn
ð2:99Þ
N 533 1869 4148 1340 1075
R2 0.46 0.53 0.47 0.60 0.61
Panel B: Post-subprime (2007:Q2–2009:Q2)
AAA AA A BBB Spec
Intercept 2:5nn
ð2:00Þ
2:6
ð1:00Þ 1:0
nnn
ð2:66Þ
24:9
ð1:42Þ 30:2
n
ð1:65Þ
1PC 0:05n
ð1:91Þ
0:48nnn
ð4:50Þ
0:45nnn
ð4:64Þ
0:67nnn
ð3:18Þ
1:16nnn
ð4:33Þ
2PC 0:08
ð0:57Þ
0:15
ð1:60Þ 0:26
nn
ð2:27Þ
0:03
ð0:05Þ
0:73
ð1:21Þ
3PC 0:066
ð1:21Þ 0:153
nnn
ð2:96Þ
0:146nnn
ð3:27Þ
0:389n
ð1:75Þ
0:349
ð0:90Þ
4PC 0:125
ð1:35Þ 0:283
nnn
ð5:14Þ
0:267nnn
ð4:07Þ
0:110n
ð1:81Þ
0:900
ð1:40Þ
5PC 0:35nnn
ð2:75Þ
0:18
ð1:17Þ 0:17
nnn
ð7:65Þ
0:46
ð0:90Þ
0:52
ð0:97Þ
6PC 0:09n
ð1:76Þ
0:17
ð1:30Þ 0:41
n
ð1:67Þ
0:30n
ð1:70Þ
1:00nn
ð2:57Þ
7PC 0:07
ð0:68Þ 0:39
n
ð1:79Þ
0:22
ð1:24Þ
0:44
ð1:08Þ 0:58
nn
ð1:98Þ
8PC 0:12n
ð1:72Þ
0:07
ð0:30Þ 0:29
nn
ð2:14Þ
1:04
ð1:11Þ
0:63
ð0:54Þ
Age 0:03nnn
ð4:83Þ
0:02
ð0:84Þ
0:02
ð0:52Þ
0:10
ð1:02Þ 0:18
nnn
ð3:12Þ
Amount issued 0:087nnn
ð4:22Þ
0:101
ð1:27Þ
0:009
ð0:09Þ
0:715
ð1:04Þ
0:571
ð0:72Þ
Forecast dispersion 18:32nnn
ð3:07Þ
0:13nnn
ð3:75Þ
0:15nnn
ð3:34Þ
0:76nnn
ð7:31Þ
1:06nnn
ð4:31Þ
Coupon 0:10nnn
ð4:46Þ
0:10nn
ð2:07Þ
0:02
ð0:17Þ
0:50
ð1:34Þ
0:09
ð0:19Þ
10y Swap 0:32nnn
ð6:18Þ
0:07
ð0:24Þ
0:09
ð0:22Þ 1:33
nnn
ð3:25Þ
3:18nnn
ð3:05Þ
10y–1y Swap 0:400nn
ð2:17Þ
0:490
ð1:58Þ 0:820
n
ð1:95Þ
0:962
ð1:23Þ 1:962
nnn
ð2:59Þ
Equity vol 0:096nnn
ð6:22Þ
0:055nnn
ð3:82Þ
0:050nnn
ð3:64Þ
0:050nnn
ð3:06Þ
0:097nnn
ð3:24Þ
Pretax1 0:836nn
ð2:17Þ
0:004
ð0:21Þ 0:098
n
ð1:80Þ
0:051
ð0:53Þ
0:001
ð0:44Þ
Pretax2 0:422nnn
ð5:33Þ
0:033
ð0:93Þ
0:000
ð0:00Þ
0:073
ð0:53Þ
0:442
ð0:53Þ
Pretax3 0:144
ð0:78Þ 0:041
nnn
ð2:59Þ
0:003
ð0:37Þ
0:076
ð0:81Þ
0:000
ðNaNÞ
Pretax4 0:003
ð0:65Þ 0:052
n
ð1:83Þ
0:008
ð0:50Þ
0:067
ð0:62Þ
0:000
ðNaNÞ
Sales to income 0:108n
ð1:68Þ
0:003nnn
ð4:56Þ
0:001nnn
ð3:79Þ
0:002nnn
ð7:81Þ
0:013
ð1:25Þ
Long term debt to asset 0:256nnn
ð2:67Þ
0:009
ð0:71Þ 0:044
nn
ð2:40Þ
0:058
ð1:56Þ 0:108
nnn
ð4:57Þ
Leverage ratio 0:184n
ð1:92Þ
0:000
ð0:00Þ 0:026
nnn
ð3:55Þ
0:005
ð0:17Þ 0:106
nnn
ð13:08Þ
Time- to-maturity 0:024nnn
ð6:00Þ
0:015
ð0:96Þ 0:035
n
ð1:72Þ
0:064
ð1:43Þ 0:124
nnn
ð2:63Þ
N 414 1549 2533 539 464
R2 0.84 0.71 0.67 0.79 0.72
J. Dick-Nielsen et al. / Journal of Financial Economics 103 (2012) 471–492 491The table shows that only the ﬁrst principal component
consistently predicts yield spreads, while the remaining
seven principal components are mostly insigniﬁcant andoften with conﬂicting signs. This suggests that although
liquidity has many different aspects, l explains much of the
impact of liquidity on yield spreads.
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